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I. INTRODUCTION
A. OBJECTIVE AND PURPOSE
The objective of this thesis is to separate, from the
perspective of a chargeback management control system
design, what academic and organizational areas are of most
relevance and which particular aspects of each an organiza-
tion should include in its synthesis of a chargeback system
concept. This method of approach should provide the reader
with a clearer insight into the theory of chargeback, its
implicit biases, its academic home, and its selective focus.
The thesis is designed to stress the important point that
to gain a robust perspective of what a chargeback system is;
it is essential to examine both the academic and actual opera-
tional aspects. After a careful analysis of the two areas, the
author adds his own integrative perspective. This integrative
perspective highlights and brings to the fore some areas that
the current academic and operational views either completely
ignore or deemphasize. In particular, the author's contribu-
tion serves to shift the emphasis from the technological (or
inward looking) perspective to the managerial (or outward look-
ing) perspective.
The thread used to tie the various chapters together is
the argument advanced by Bernard et. al. (1977) that charge-
back should be regarded not simply as a cost recovery
mechanism but as a tool for management control. To be
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effective, a chargeback system must not only be aligned
with the particular circumstances within which it will
operate, but must also coordinate and control the cost
of computer operations, computer capacity, and user demand.
This thesis does not attempt to specify an "ideal" form
of a chargeback system. Instead, it lays out principles,
considerations, and alternatives so as to provide guidance
in dealing with a chargeback system in a management control
environment.
In an attempt to understand chargeback, it is first
necessary to examine the basic fundamentals of the business
of managing data processing (DP) services in general. An
approach of this nature requires a wide perspective. This
chapter develops that perspective by providing the reader
with:
(1) a general overview of a Navy Regional Data Automation
Center's (NARDAC) Mission;
(2) a clear understanding of the type of management con-
trol system being examined and discussed;
(3) the role that a management control system plays in
an organization;
(4) a brief introduction to the reasons for implementing
a chargeback control system;
(5) a look at some of the design issues for a chargeback
control system;
(6) an overview of how the thesis is organized.
B. NAVY REGIONAL DATA AUTOMATION CENTERS MISSION
Navy Regional Data Automation Centers (NARDAC s) are the
Navy's general purpose data processing (DP) centers
operating under the auspices of the Naval Data Automation
Command (NAVDAC) . In the private sector, a Navy Regional
Data Automation Center (NARDAC) could be compared to a large
information processing service agency. A NARDAC ' s raison d'
etre is to provide high quality, low cost, general purpose
DP services to support activities (clients) in regions of
high concentration of Navy commands. Each NARDAC is operated
as a non-profit service facility dedicated to improving the
quality and efficiency of computing services available to
Navy activities within its geographical boundary. Typically,
the DP services offered by a NARDAC range from one time
technical consultations to the full range of tasks involved
in software and hardware project development, and processing
applications on a scheduled production basis. Therefore,
most of the management literature that deals with corporate
general purpose DP management can be applied to the study
of NARDACs.
C. CATEGORIZING CONTROL SYSTEMS
A well known and respected taxonomy of organizational
control systems was developed by Anthony (1965). Anthony
views managerial activities as falling into three categories
and argues that each is sufficiently different in kind to
require distinctive planning and control systems. The first
of these categories is strategic planning. Strategic planning
according to Anthony is:
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The purpose of deciding on objectives of the organization,
on changes in the objectives, on the resources used to
attain these objectives, and on politics that are to
govern acquisition use, and disposition of resources. (1965,
p. 24)
Defining objectives implies an emphasis on scanning the
organization's environment. The strategic planning process
typically involves senior management and analysts and re-
quires lots of innovation and creativity.
The second category is management control. Anthony
defines management control to be:
The process by which managers assure that resources are
obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the
accomplishment of the organization's objectives. (1965,
p. 27)
Anthony stresses three key issues in management con-
trol :
(1) the activities of management control involve con-
siderable inter-personal interaction;
(2) it takes place within the context of the policies
and objectives developed in the strategic planning
process
;
(3) its paramount aim is to assure effective and efficient
performance
.
Anthony's third category is operational control. Opera-
tional control is the process of assuring that specific tasks
are effectively and efficiently carried out. In addition,
operational control is concerned with performing predefined
activities whereas management control relates to the organiza-
tion's goals and policies. There are less "judgement calls"
required in operational control, because the tasks, goals,
and resources have already been explicitly defined (Anthony, 1965)
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Anthony, as well as many other noted authors, among
them Keen and Scott Morten (1978), and Sprague and Carlson
(1982) , recognize that the three control boundaries are
not clear-cut and often overlap. Anthony's definitions
are, however, useful for analyzing information system
needs and activities.
The information needs of each of the three categories
are very different. For example, the strategic planning
area is primarily concerned with collecting data about
the organization's environment (i.e., economic, political,
community image, etc.) (Fink et. al
.
, 1983). Operational
control is concerned with data on how efficient and effective
specific day-to-day tasks are being performed (Fink et. al.,
1983). Management control, on the other hand, requires data
on the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization's
overall performance.
Administratively, users of a data processing center are
coordinated and controlled as elements of the management
control system through their demand for computer products and
services (Ein-Dor and Jones, 1985). In the chargeback
environment, the controlling mechanism is the chargeback
system and user DP budgets. The budgets are for the life
cycle of the system, each placing an upper bound on the life
cycle expenditures for a specific user (Ein-Dor and Jones,
1985). Therefore, chargeback seeks to balance the DP system
12
and to provide the users with information they perceive to
be of maximum value over the system's life cycle.
Clearly, the managerial control framework provides the
proper perspective for analyzing the effects of a chargeback
system. Accordingly, the emphasis throughout this thesis
will be from the managerial control perspective.
D. ROLE OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS
A management control system may be viewed as a network
of "sensors" that sense the organization's operations. It
focuses primarily on guiding the organization on a year-to-
year basis. The control system, however, does the guiding
in such a manner as to be consistent with the organization's
long-range planning strategy (Cash et. al., 1983). In
effect, the management control system monitors the progress
of operations and alerts the "appropriate management level"
when performance as measured by the system deviates from
established standards. To be effective, the management
control system must be capable of: incorporating the sophistica-
tion of the users; the geographic dispersion of the users; the
stability of management; and the interdepartmental relation-
ships with the service organization (Cash et. al., 1983).
The typical management control models found in the
chargeback literature tend to stress the financial control
architecture, the financial control processes, and the audit
function (Brandon, 1978; Anderson, 1983). In an operating
DP environment, however, non-financial management control
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is just as important for ensuring efficient and effective
utilization of computer products and services. For example,
DP management must constantly survey the computer services
market and its user community to determine the adequacy of
DP support being provided. The results of the survey
should be used to ascertain where improvements in computer
efficienty and/or service effectiveness can be made. In
addition, DP management must plan and forecast user requirements
for the purpose of long-range system, software, labor
acquisition, and utilization planning.
E. CONCEPTS UNDERLYING A CHARGEBACK CONTROL SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATICI
One of the most popular management techniques for at-
tempting to control DP is the implementation of a chargeback
system (Dearden and Nolan, 1973; Bernard et. al., 1977).
In a chargeback system, users are charged an appropriate
fee, computed by formula, for their use of computer products
and services on a job-by-job basis.
Ein-Dor and Jones (1985) advance the argument that
charging for computer resource usage creates an environment
wherein the computing resource functions as a "utility"
that serves the user organization. They emphasize the fact
that maintaining an accurate and equitable pricing system
over time is a complex task requiring detailed planning,
careful monitoring of change and periodic adjustments.
Moreover, they argue that the pricing mechanism employed
must at least measure computer workload in terms of supply
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and demand for computer products and services in an economic
sense across the major components of the corporate organiza-
tional structure for the life cycle of the system.
McFarlan (1973) states that reporting from a chargeback
system is "crucial" for monitoring overall performance and
identifying sources of problems. Nolan (1977) enhances
McFarland's argument by pointing out that an effective
chargeback system is "essential" if users of computing
resources are to be in control and held accountable for the
services they receive. Although implied but never explicitly
stated is the assumption that to be effective, a chargeback
management control and reporting system should be employed
to point out control problems, not necessarily to find
wrong doers.
F. PROBLEMS FACING CHARGEBACK CONTROL DESIGN
The fairly recent and rapid growth of information systems
technology has created new challenges for DP management.
Major investments in computing hardware and application
software coupled with the ever expanding role of DP has
had a profound effect on the management of these organizations
Organizations have goals that change over time and, therefore,
require a control system mechanism that must be sufficiently
flexible to continue to meet those changing goals (Anthony
and Dearden, 1980; Euske, 1984). A poorly developed, im-
plemented, and managed or inflexible chargeback control
system can have grave consequences on the management of a
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computing facility. The effects can range anywhere from
capacity saturation and low prices to low demand and high
prices (Dearden and Nolan, 1973). Therefore, the argument
is introduced that for a chargeback control system to be
effective, it must:
(1) provide financial control for the purpose of ensuring
efficient and effective use of computer products and
services
;
(2) provide a means to effect DP-user goal synchroniza-
tion. That is, instead of communicating hardware
resource utilization, the chargeback system should
enable the users, DP, and executive management to




Chapter I began by introducing the reader to the objectives
and purpose of the thesis. Additionally, the following points
were developed and discussed in order to provide the reader
with the proper background for understanding chargeback:
(1) NARDAC ' s Mission; (2) a definition of a management con-
trol system; (3) the role that a management control system
plays in an organization; (4) a brief overview of a "generic"
chargeback system; and (5) some issues facing design of a
chargeback management control system.
Chapter II provides a more in-depth look at a typical
NARDAC by examining: (1) its mission and function; (2) its
organizational structure; and (3) its client-users.
Chapter III provides a basic academic overview of a
chargeback system. The following topics are discussed in-
depth: (1) the establishment of management goals; (2) the
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objectives of a chargeback system; (3) the typical account-
ing systems used in a chargeback system; and (4) typical
chargeback performance standards (or criteria)
.
Chapter IV discusses the NARDAC chargeback system m-
depth. In particular, the NARDAC ' s management policy and
objectives for the system, billing algorithm and rate de-
termination, performance criteria, and performance evaluation
methods are discussed.
Chapter V prescribes what the author considers to be the
preferred chargeback objectives that all chargeback systems,
including NARDACs, should espouse. Within the chapter, it
is argued that the most important objectives are: (1) financial
control; and (2) DP-user goal synchronization. How the DP
organization through the use of chargeback attempts to attain
these objectives can have a direct effect on how the organiza-
tion is viewed by the user community. Additionally, the
chapter introduces some management guidelines that provide
a simplistic, but nevertheless, viable framework for bridging
the gap between planning and a chargeback system. The frame-
work, if properly applied and managed, should move a DP
organization along the road to attaining the preferred ob-
jectives and, furthermore, put to rest the argument that
"effective planning" for future systems cannot be done properly
in a chargeback environment.
Chapter VI presents what the author considers to be pre-
ferred chargeback performance criteria. Within the chapter,
17
it is argued that chargeback performance criteria must
be understandable and to some extent, controllable by
the user if the objectives of Chapter V are to be attained.
A strategy for accomplishing this feat is presented. The
necessary DP-user bridge is a DP Service Agreement.
Chapter VII explores both the concept and application
of measurement as it relates to the management of DP.
Measurement is an abstract concept that is glossed over, if
its addressed at all, in most management literature on
chargeback (Anderson, 1983; Cortada, 1980; Schaeffer, 1981)
.
Therefore, good literature in this area is extremely sparse.
Within the chapter, the author advances the argument that:
(1) measure in a DP enviornment' is not as objective as
many people believe;
(2) does not exist away from the application it purports
to measure; and
(3) cannot be transported from application to application
or from organization to organization.
To this end, emphasis is placed on answering such diverse
questions as:
(1) What is measurement?;
(2) What are the functional dimensions of measurement?;
(3) What is the theory behind the development and applica-
tion of measurement standards?; and
(4) What measurement tools are needed in a preferred
chargeback environment such as that presented in
Chapters V and VI?
Chapter VIII prescribes an "ideal climate" for the ef-
fective operation of the NARDAC chargeback system. While
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the discussion may be slanted toward the Navy's DP environ-
ment, the arguments apply equally well to a DP organiza-
tion within a commercial enterprise. First, a two-tiered
structure for a NARDAC is recommended. The lower level
consists of a well-structured, well-controlled procedures
that include the chargeback system. The second level has
sufficient slack in terms of dollars and personnel so that
a NARDAC can maintain a research and development focus.
Secondly, a joint user-DP educational design effort starting
at the NAVDAC level is called out.
Chapter IX is a recapitulation of the important points
developed and discussed within the thesis.
19
II. BACKGROUND OF THE NAVY REGIONAL DATA AUTOMATION CENTERS
A. INTRODUCTION
Before an analysis of the Navy Regional Data Automation
Center (NARDAC) chargeback system can be made, it is necessary
to have a basic understanding of the NARDAC organization and
environment. This chapter provides the reader with that basic
understanding by taking a broad look at the mission and func-
tions of the Navy Regional Data Automation Centers (NARDACs)
and then moving in for a close examination of the typical
organizational structure and users of a NARDAC. For a more
comprehensive study of the problems facing the Navy in the
mid-to-late 1970 's, and why NARDACs were created, the reader
is referred to Lambert (1982).
3. FORMULATION AND PURPOSE
The Navy for many years has espoused a philosophy of
centralized policy and decentralized management and opera-
tion. In the majority of cases, this concept appears to be
a viable one that suits numerous major Navy commands and
their resulting functions. In some areas, however, and in
particular in nontactical DP, the concept appeared to be
less than satisfactory (O'Brien, 1978). Persistent problems
in the management and operations of the Navy's nontactical
DP program led to the establishment of a series of NARDACs




There are currently seven NARDACs, located in Washington,
D.C., Norfolk, Jacsonviile, Pensacola, San Francisco, San
Diego, and New Orleans. These seven NARDACs control approx-
imately 25-30% of the Navy's DP assets and are controlled
and coordinated by the Naval Data Automation Command (NAVDAC)
located in the Navy Yards in Washington, D.C. (Scott, 1984).
The NARDACs are designed to provide a full range of
DP services to their respective geographic areas. The pri-
mary purpose is to provide the Navy with "centers of excellence"
that will be able to provide DP services, programming sup-
port, technical expertise, trouble shooting, telecommunica-
tions networking, distributed processing, and other related
DP services. Through the NARDACs, the Navy has economically
brought time-sharing services in house, promoted standardized
computing systems and application programs for a variety of
of Naval activities, and offered automation alternatives to
smaller activities not now utilizing a computer's capabilities
(NAVDAC, 1986)
.
Included in the NARDAC support are a series of smaller
DP service facilities called Navy Data Automation Facilities
(NAVDAFs)
. The NAVDAFs are satellites of the larger NARDACs.
NAVDAFs were established to broaden the scope of the Navy's
DP support. NAVDAF sites are located in aich areas as Corpus
Christi, Newport, Great Lakes, Orlando, and Pearl Harbor to
name a few. NAVDAFs provide on site support to major Navy
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commands and activities having special DP requirements in
areas not otherwise supported by a NARDAC (NAVDAC, 1986).
The NAVDAC/NARDAC /NAVDAF organization is specifically
designed to work together as one community in providing
DP services to a myriad of clients. With scores of ex-
ternal customers, a NARDAC can be likened to a computer
service bureau in the commercial world. The comparison
breaks down, however, when the respective motivations for
existence are compared. A commercial service bureau is
in business to make a profit. A NARDAC ' s sole purpose is
to provide a non-profit DP service to operational customers.
Therefore, a NARDAC might better be compared to the informa-
tion services department of a large business conglomerate
instead of a service bureau.
C. ORGANIZATION
Though geographically separate from one another, each
NARDAC was organized under a standard structure patterned
after its parent NAVDAC. For example, NARDAC San Francisco
consists of the office of the Commanding Officer, the office
of the Executive Officer, the office of the Technical Director,
and a Liaison Planning Staff Support Office. The following
departments complete the structure: (1) the Management
Support Division (Code 20); (2) the Technical Support
Department (Code 30); (3) the Data Processing Programming
Support Department (Code 40); and (4) the Data Processing
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CODE 2 CODE 3 CODE 4 CODE 50
Figure 1 Typical NARDAC Organizational Structure
Source: U.S. Naval Data Automation Command.
"The General Overview," NAVDAC Regional Data
Automation Services, v. 1, 1986, p. 13.
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MANAGEMENT SUPPORT (CODE 20) TECHNICAL SUPPORT (CODE 30)
* Budget and Accounting
* Management Services
* Training Coordination
* Physical Security and
Facilities Management
* Standards and Procedures
* Systems Software Programming
* Teleprocessing Networking
and Configuration Planning
* Performance Analysis and
Measurement
* Advanced Technical Studies
* ADP Security Technical
Assistance and Consultation
DATA PROCESSING PROGRAMMING DATA PROCESSING INSTALLATION
SUPPORT DEPARTMENT (CODE 40) DEPARTMENT (CODE 50)
* Computer Operations




* ADP Production Control
* Data Libraries in Magnetic
Media
* ADP Risk Management Technical
Assistance and Consultation
Figure 2 Typical NARDAC Departmental Responsibilities
* Client Requirements
Analysis
* Client ADP Systems
Analysis
* Client ADP Application
Programming and
Documentation
* Technical Assistance and
Consultation
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typical NARDAC organizational structure. The major re-
sponsibilities of the departments within a NARDAC are
depicted in Figure 2
.
D. USERS
Almost all the NARDAC facility users are operational
forces and staffs. Figure 3 displays a few of the major
users of a typical NARDAC, broken down by reimbursable and
mission-funded customers (i.e., Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) or
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III. BASIC OVERVIEW OF A CHARGEBACK SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the fundamental theory underlying a
chargeback system is broken down into its individual com-
ponents and each component explored and discussed. By using
an approach of this nature, it is hoped the the reader will
more readily grasp the academic theory and reasoning behind
the implementation of a chargeback system.
B. ESTABLISHMENT OF MANAGEMENT GOALS
A chargeback management control system is a process,
or more precisely a set of processes, through which an
organization attempts to ensure that actual data processing
activities conform to planned activities (Cash et. al., 1983).
A chargeback management control system must, therefore, be
a dynamic entity capable of responding to and causing response
from users to the dynamic goals of the organiztion (Bernard
et. al., 1977) . Moreover, the chargeback control system must
be sensitive to the changing demands of DP users (Popadic,
1980) . In addition, it must provide a framework for both
efficient and effective resource utilization in a climate
of future planning and current organizational performance
monitoring (McKell et. al., 1979).
To be an effective information supplying mechanism for
management control, a chargeback system must ultimately
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answer the question: "How are we doing?". The answer
to the question encompasses not only the organization's
financial health, but also: DP output or production per-
formance, and progress toward the organization's overall
long-range plan (Cast et. al., 1983). Acting within the
framework of a management control system, the chargeback
model is nothing more than a measurement system. There-
fore, to be effective at measuring, a chargeback system
must possess the following attributes: a feedforward
mechanism (ex ante) for development of DP policy and pro-
cedures; and a feedback system (ex post) that continuously
monitors DP management's progress toward attainment of the
overall organization's goals (Flamholtz et. al
.
, 1985).
C. OBJECTIVES OF A CHARGEBACK SYSTEM
Typically, as alluded to in Chapter I, the motivation
for implementation of a chargeback system results from a
desire to achieve one or all of the following objectives
(Popadic, 1977; Kekic, 1980; Bernard et. al., 1977; Schaller,
1974; McFarlan and Nolan, 1975):
(1) cost recovery;
(2) effective allocation of computer services and
products
;
(3) regulation of demand for computer services and
products
.
Basically, the desire to recover costs originates from
entrenched cost accounting and reporting conventions for
evaluating performance. The objective of effective allocation
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of computing resources stems from the perspective that
computer resources are scarce and, as such, priorities
must be assigned to the application having the highest
utility (Ein-Dor and Jones, 1985) . Closely aligned with
this concept is the concern for regulating demand. Some
form of demand regulation is needed in order to ensure
that computer resources are not overtaxed during some
periods, and underutilized at other times (Ein-Dor and
Jones, 1985) . Ultimately, demand regulations exist to
constrain users to demand services within the organizationally
chosen level of DP resources available (Ein-Dor and Jones,
1985)
.
Clearly, management's motivations and objectives in
charging for computing services and products will vary
from one organization to another. Nevertheless, as stated
above, the primary objectives are typically all related in
some fashion to controlling the organization's computing
activity. Simply stated, a chargeback system charges users
for the processing costs of their application systems. This
permits the users to make a "judgement call" as to whether
or not their application systems should be modified, replaced,
or dropped entirely. Therefore, a chargeback system encourages
users to cost justify their use of DP products and services
(Bernard et. al., 1977 ; Davis and Wetherbe, 1980). Implicit
within chargeback theory is the assumption that by controlling
DP products and service usage through chargeback, wasteful
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applications are eliminated, the efficiency of the remain-
ing applications are increased, and the development and
implementation of new cost justified applications are
stimulated (Nolan, 1977; Brandon, 1978).
More to the point, organizations have historically
implemented chargeback systems with an eye toward the
accomplishment of some, if not all, of the following
(Schechinger, 1983) :
(1) improvement of DP cost control;
(2) increase DP efficiency;
(3) increase the users' awareness of DP costs;
(4) cause users to critically evaluate their DP require-
ments based on the economic value of the requested
product or service vis-a'-vis the cost. For example,
critically evaluate the cost of producing a report
against the value of the report in a decision making
process
.
(5) recovery of DP costs;
(6) effective allocation of computer resources and the
encouragement of central processing unit (CPU) load
leveling, by charging a premium for jobs requiring a
high priority or offering a discount for lower
priority jobs.
The degree of realization of chargeback system objectives
and the chargeback algorithms selected to attain those ob-
jectives implicity define management's philosophy and ob-
jectives regarding the role of DP in the overall organization.
(Bernard et. al., 1977; McFarlan and Nolan, 1975). Basically,
chargeback can take one of two approaches: the cost approach;
or the pricing approach. The distinction between the two
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approaches involves both economic and accounting theory.
The basic argument appears to be: should an organization
disassociate the price charged for a computer resource
from the total cost of operating the resource (Rizzuto
and Rizzuto, 1978)? For example, iMcKell et. al. (1979)
state that the cost approach motivation is mainly one of
seeking to recover the cost of computing services. The
price approach, on the other hand, considers the demand
for resources to be of importance in coordinating the
availability and allocation of computing resources in
both a rational and effective manner.
It should be noted, however, that there need be no
direct lock-step relationship between the cost of providing
a computer product or service and the price charged the
user for that product or service (Rizzuto and Rizzuto, 1978)
The price for a service or product assuming a purely com-
petive marketplace is based on the demand for that product
or service. In theory, the more demand exceeds supply, the
higher the price. Conversely, again in theory, the more
supply exceeds demand, the lower the price. However, if
price drops below the cost to produce a given service, that
particular service will not be provided. At the point
where demand equals supply, cost will equal price. This is
commonly called the supply-demand equilibrium point in
economic textbooks (Ein-Dor and Jones, 1985).
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This begs the question of what constitutes "price"?
Strictly speaking the computer center costs relevant to any
specific decision on resource usage are the marginal, or
incremental, costs of the resources involved (Ein-Dor and
Jones, 1985). For example, in deciding whether to imple-
ment a new computer application, the costs that need to be
considered in relation to the anticipated benefits are the
incremental costs of providing the resources required for
the new system. Thus, if users are to be led to make
economically sound decisions on the basis of the chargeback
system charges, those charges need to reflect the incremental
cost of the associated resources (Ein-Dor and Jones, 1985).
It is awfully hard for the typical user to discern incre-
mental charges in this context. Nevertheless, it is clear
that the incremental costs of resources will not necessarily
equate to the average unit costs calculated through conventional
cost accounting procedures (Ein-Dor and Jones, 1985). Given
the economics of scale normally associated to mainframe com-
puting, incremental costs will be lower than the prices re-
quired to fully recover the cost of the computer center
(Ein-Dor and Jones, 1985)
.
The Office of the Comptroller, Navy (NAVCOMPT) has
interpreted the Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) accounting rules
and procedures to mean that NARDACs can only charge a user
the actual (ie. the accounting) cost of running his applica-
tion. Therefore, a lock-step relation between cost and
31
price is assumed by NAVCOMPT. Because of the NAVCOMPT
interpretation, NARDACs fall prey to the following argument
advanced by Singer et. al .
:
If demand for a good is low, its price may well fall
below cost, transmitting information to the producer
that demand is inadequate. Unless price is permitted
to fall below cost, the proper information about demand
may never be obtained, and the allocation of resources
can never adjust properly to the unprof itability of that
good (1968, p. 494)
.
It should be noted at this point that a price structure
designed to reflect full resource cost recovery will not
necessarily always provide the appropriate basis for guiding
user decisions on computer resource usage (more about this
later) . Suffice it is to say at this point that the emphasis
in charging should be on controlling users' overall demands
for computer resources, rather than based strictly on the
recovery of hardware resource costs (Ein-Dor and Jones, 1985) .
The following chargeback systems (or techniques) have been
gleaned from chargeback literature and appear to be the more
widely used systems and therefore, the most appropriate for
further discussion.
D. ACCOUNTING SYSTEM USED
Just as there are several different goals and objectives
that a chargeback system seeks to attain, there are several
methods of accounting for DP products and services. The
choice of a type of accounting system to employ is admittedly
made on the basis of considerations more involved than merely
the desire to attain a specific chargeback objective and/or
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organizational goal (Wiorkowski and Wiorkowski, 1973;
Schaller, 1974; Cortada, 1980). Nevertheless, employment
of certain types of chargeback systems facilitate the
attainment of some objectives and goals but not others.
1 . Free Good
The simplest approach to a chargeback system is not
to have one at all. Under this system, computer products
and services are treated as a free good. All DP costs are
accumulated in various overhead accounts and treated as
administrative costs. Problems with the free good approach
are:
(1) No method to ensure that only cost effective
applications are run on the computer system (McKell
et. al. , 1979) .
(2) No method to ensure that efficient programming tech-
niques are employed in development of application
programs (McKell et. al., 1979).
(3) Resource allocation is made by arbitrary administra-
tion rules (ie. political clout) or by placing undue
pressure on computer operators and management (ie.
arm twisting) (McKell et. al., 1979; Dearden and
Nolan, 1973)
.
(4) Perpetual computer saturation, so that DP management
has no clear idea as to when additional capacity should
be installed (Nielsen, 1968; McKell et. al
.
, 1979).
Users in a free good environment often are encouraged
to automate applications which are more economically per-
formed by manual means (Schaeffer, 1981). In addition, once
a user gains access to DP services, he more or less feels
that he has a vested right to continue to use the services
as long as he wishes (Schaeffer, 1981). Therefore, a user
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may automate some jobs that will later exclude more deserving
applications from automation because of the perpetual
saturation problem.
2. Full Cost Systems
Probably the easiest chargeback system to develop,
implement, and operate is the full cost method, or some-
times referred to as the average cost method. Under this
method, the total cost of operating the computer facility
is divided by total utilization to produce a flat rate
stated in dollars per hour. The operating costs and utiliza-
tion rate are forecasted for the next period (weekly or
monthly) to produce the next period's prices (Schaller,
1974) . In some organizations, the actual costs are used
and the rates and charges are determined retroactively
(Schaller, 1974) .
A major problem with the full cost approach accord-
ing to Schaller (1974) is maintaining charge stability. As
utilization of the computer increases, the rate to be
charged decreases because of the large amount of fixed
costs as compared to variable costs. The problem with
decreasing rates is that users are encouraged to demand more
products and services, and because of limited computer capacity
capacity, turnaround time goes from acceptable to completely
unacceptable. On the other hand, a decrease in utilization
causes the opposite spiral to happen. As usage goes down,
rates go up, driving usage down further and rates up higher.
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Unless corrections are made it is possible for a customer
under the full cost method to use fewer computer products
and services and have an increase in his charges (ie. assuming
total computer utilization also decreases)
.
Because the rates reflect all the costs of the ser-
vice provided, the full cost method supplies very good
quantitative information for a project costing, cost-benefit
analysis, and profit efficiency evaluation ( EDP Analyzer,
July, 1974; Dearden and Nolan, 1973) . Therefore, the full
cost method successfully attains the objectives of cost
recovery but only in a general sense. If a user has no funds,
he gets no service.
When users pay a flat rate for services, regardless
of when they are requested, there is no incentive to re-
quest services during non-peak periods (Schaller, 1974)
.
This may lead to bottlenecks and slow turnaround times dur-
ing peak periods (assuming the computer is operated for short
periods beyond its capacity) , while night and weekend shifts
may be underutilized.
Using a longer time frame for determining rates
will increase the variance from actual costs but decrease
the rates fluctuation problem. Setting rates for a year
period is standard costing.
3 . Standard Cost Systems
The standard cost method charges users a non-fluctu-
ating standard cost per unit of usage. By setting the rate
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at the beginning of the year and not changing it, the DP
organization is encouraged to keep costs to standard (Popadic,
1975). Variances between actual and standard can be used
to evaluate the DP organization's efficiency (Davis and
Wetherbe, 1980). Some costs, however, particularly those
due to volume considerations, may be beyond the DP manage-
ment's control (Popadic, 1975). By analyzing the variances,
the reason for cost growth can be pinpointed by comparing
the fixed standard costs to the actual charges (Davis and
Wetherbe, 1980) .
The non-fluctuating rate eliminates the two major
disadvantages of the full cost method. Standard rates do
not change, allowing users to more accurately plan their
DP costs for the accounting period. Theoretically, the
user can depend on a job costing the same each time it is
run (Popadic, 1975). Moreover, prices do not rise in a
period of low demand. Therefore, computer under utilization
will not be compounded.
There are disadvantages with the standard cost
method, however. First, the rates will not reflect upgrades
or improvements in the system until the end of the accounting
period when the charges are reviewed. Second, at any one
point in time, users' demand for computer products and
services may exceed computer capacity. Standard costing
provides no impetus for establishing priorities, or for
running jobs in non-peak periods. Third, choosing a
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chargeback algorithm for standard costing can be difficult,
because no algorithm accomplishes all the desirable chargeback
objectives (Popadic, 1975).
In an attempt to eliminate the peak load problem,
many organizations have adopted a variation of the standard
cost method by introducing lower rates during non-peak
periods. In addition, surcharges are applied for high priority
jobs. This strategy has proven somewhat successful, particu-
larly among users of batch processing, in smoothing out work-
loads between shifts, and lowering the number of high
priority jobs (Popadic, 1975).
4 . Flexible Price Chargeback Systems
If control of computer resources is the primary
concern of management, flexible pricing should be employed.
Rather than basing user charges on rates determined by cost,
charges in a flexible price system are based on the economic
value of the resource used (Ein-Dor and Jones, 1985) . The
EDP Analyzer describes it thus:
If some resource is constrained in the amount that can
be obtained, then it is priced according to its economic
value, not according to its cost (November 1973, p. 6)
.
An important aspect of flexible price chargeback
systems is the value placed on differences in levels of
service. Service is usually defined in terms of turnaround
time. Therefore, prices can be set for several different
service levels. For example, Level I, turnaround time of
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one hour; Level II, turnaround time of two hours; Level
III, turnaround time of five hours, and so on.
A second important aspect of flexible price systems
concerns resource congestion. If congestion during particu-
lar shifts is a problem, flexible pricing can be used to
effectively smooth out the peaks. By making the price of
resource usage an increasing function of time, or memory
volume during busy shifts and a decreasing function of time
or memory volume during under utilized shifts, users will
be strongly motivated to run long batch jobs during slack
periods (Schaller, 1974) .
Flexible price chargeback systems, if properly im-
plemented and operated, can be used to attain many of the
objectives of a chargeback system (Dearden and Nolan, 1973) .
The primary disadvantage of flexible price systems are that
they are expensive, involve vast amounts of overhead, are
complicated, and thus complex to administer.
In summary, many factors should be considered in
choosing a cost allocation technique. Management must clearly
define its objectives for the DP organization and choose
the chargeback algorithm (allocation technique) and base
which best serves these objectives (McFarlan et. al., 1973;
Bernard et. al., 1977).
D. CHARGEBACK SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
A number of authors propose performance criteria that
a chargeback system "should meet". The following selection
points out the wide diversity of proposed performance
criteria. For example, Wiorkowski and Wiorkowski (1973)
recommend that a chargeback system be equitable, reproducible,
and realistic. Bookman (1972) offers accuracy, repeatability,
understandability , and competiveness . Kekic (1980) states
that the chargeback system should embrace all of the above
criteria, plus be auditable, and recover all operating
costs. (Kekic 1 s performance criteria are defined and ex-
plored in more detail in Chapter IV) . Hootman (1969) con-
tributes the following to the list: user control; and
demurrage (a user should be charged for resources made
unavailable to other users) . The opinion of many more
authors could be listed, but these should be sufficient to
make the point: there are many possible criteria that a
charging system could meet. It is management's responsibility
to decide just which ones chargeback should meet in order to
attain the desired objectives of the organization. A more
comprehensive study of this point is provided in Chapter VI.
The desirable chargeback criteria should follow from
the goals and objectives of the chargeback system as defined
by top management. In general, the basic objective is to
influence DP and user behavior in support of organizational
goals. In order to do this, all parties concerned must
believe that the system is basically a fair one, taken
seriously by top management, and above all, part of the
overall planning and control structure of the organization.
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IV. NAVY REGIONAL DATA AUTOMATION CENTER CHARGEBACK SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
The Naval Data Automation Command (NAVDAC) is an
echelon II command of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV)
.
It consists of a headquarters staff located in Washington,
D.C. having echelon III and IV DP support field activities
known as Navy Regional Data Automation Centers (NARDACs)
and Navy Data Automation Facilities (NAVDAFs) . NAVDAC, the
NARDACs, and NAVDAFs were formed as a result of the Navy
Automated Data Processing Reorganization Study and Imple-
mentation Plan of 1976. The motivating force was a need to
improve the management and operations of the Navy's mission
support DP program (Scott, 1984).
Before the reorganization, DP support was provided on
a no-charge basis by Data Processing Service Centers (DPSCs)
(O'Brien, 1978). The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(OP-91) at the time of the conversion of DPSCs to NARDACs
stated
:
The performance and economic benefits attainable from a
DPSC are not likely to be realized if its services are
furnished free of charge. The center should be operated
on a fully reimbursable basis. Total costs of operating
the center (salaries, equipment rentals, supplies, etc.)
should be reflected in a billing and accounting system
which permits customers to be billed promptly for all
fair and accurate services received. This procedure will
allow all DP support costs to be related directly to both
customer activity and the function supported. (NAVDAC,
1978)
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NARDACs are located in most regions of extensive Navy
activity. The smaller satellite NAVDAFs operate at other
large Naval installations. Teleprocessing brings NARDACs
to many more remote Navy commands requiring DP services.
Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) regulations provide
a conventional Navy financing basis for user (client)
command /NARDAC support arrangements. Additionally, NAVDAC
requires the use of standard annualized rates for different
types of support rendered at each NARDAC. To determine
these rates requires the use of the NARDAC chargeback sys-
tem. This standard cost chargeback system, operating at
all NARDACs, is used to provide monthly user statements of
charges and is the subject of the remainder of this chapter.
B. BACKGROUND
A 1975 General Accounting Office (GAO) report on Navy
DP was exceptionally critical. The report stated that the
Navy's DP was unstructured; highly decentralized; had lax
enforcement; had too much local prerogatives (i.e., too
many local commands with unique, one of a kind, DP systems
augmenting standard Navy systems) ; and had extensive duplica-
tion of Central Design Agencies (CDAs) and programmers
(Cullins, 1978) . As a result of the GAO report along with
increasing pressure from the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Financial Management (ASN (FM) ) , the Department of
the Navy's senior nontactical DP policy official, the Navy
developed a DP Reorganization Plan in 1976.
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As part of the overall reorganization plan of the Navy's
nontactical DP resources and management, NARDACs were
designed, located, and staffed. The NARDACs were formed
from existing facilities and operations in geographical
areas of which the former DPSCs formed the nucleus.
C. MANAGEMENT POLICY AND OBJECTIVES OF THE SYSTEM
NAVDAC ' s mission is to administer and coordinate the
Navy nontactical DP program. This responsibility includes
collaboration of DP matters with all Navy DP major claimants;
development of policy and procedures; approval of systems
development, acquisition, and utilization of DP equipment
and service contracts; sponsoring of DP technology; and
career development and training of DP personnel (McAdams,
1984) . For a more comprehensive and indepth discussion of
the NAVDAC and its evolution, the reader is referred to
McAdams (1984) and Lambert (1982) .
NAVDAC ' s principal policy is to improve the effective-
ness of DP systems in support of Navy operations, to exploit
all the potentials of DP teleprocessing technology in multi-
command and multi-functional DP systems, and to improve
the overall management of the Navy's DP resources (Cullins,
1978)
.
Perhaps if a single statement could serve as the ulti-
mate policy for the NAVDAC/NARDAC complex, that statement
would be "quality nontactical DP support service". Quality
nontactical DP support service to Department of the Navy
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users (clients) in support of existing applications and DP
projects planned and underway (Roth, 1986).
The primary objectives of the NARDAC chargeback system
are (NAVDAC, 1978)
:
(1) improve DP cost accounting;
(2) increase the DP activity's efficiency;
(3) provide for scare DP resource rationing;
(4) make the user aware of the cost of DP.
NAVDAC/NARDAC policies, objectives, and future were
perhaps best summed up in statements made by Captain Michael
Roth, USN, Commanding Officer of NARDAC San Francisco.
Captain Roth stated that the NARDAC ' s are not the Navy's
total or final answer to DP by any means. They do, however,
represent a sound step forward and form a firm foundation
from which to launch other NAVY DP initiatives. The long-
range goal of the NAVDAC/NARDAC complex is to improve the
management and operations of the Navy's DP resources. The
impetus is the provision of improved DP services in support
of expanding Navy missions and responsibilities.
D. PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
To meet the challenges of efficient and effective support
and overall management improvement of the Navy's nontactical
DP resources, a chargeback system was developed and imple-
mented that espoused the following performance criteria
(Kekic, 1980; Thompson, 1986):
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(1) ACCURACY—The system should accurately compute
customer charges.
(2) REPEATABLE—The cost of a job must not be contingent
on computer system load or computer system. For
example, it should not cost more to run a job on
computer system A than it does on computer system B.
(3) UNDERSTANDABLE—With minimal training, the user should
be able to determine how the charges for his job were
computed and reported.
(4) EQUITABLE--A11 charges should be based on usage data
gathered by the chargeback system's algorithm, with
each user billed only for computer resources used.
(5) PROMOTE EFFICIENT USER OF HARDWARE—The chargeback
system should encourage users to use computer
resources efficiently.
(6) AUDITABLE—Outside sources should be able to track
each billable charge from its source to its proper
use (i.e., birth to grave).
(7) COST RECOVERY— The system, in order to operate ef-
fectively, should be capable of recovering the cost
of computer resources.
E. BILLING ALGORITHM AND RATE DETERMINATION
The NARDAC chargeback system provides for ongoing
measurement of resource usage by each user. It is designed
to provide an equitable and accurate method for charging
DP costs to a resource pool consisting of nine hardware
systems and one labor pool. Individual rates are established
for each measurable component of the resource pool to allow
for equitable cost recovery from each user based on the
individual users' application (Howard, 1986). Users of the
resource pools are charged their proportional share of these
costs through the use of a billing algorithm. The billing
algorithm develops an account charge (AC) by transforming
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resource usage into the equivalent costs in terms of ADP
resource units (ARUs) . ARUs represent the total cost of
producing the DP product or service in a Navy Industrial
Fund (NIF) environment (Kekic, 1980). The use of pooled
rates allows for equal distribution of DP resource costs
to all users based upon usage (NAVDAC, 1978) . Figure 4 is
an example of the NARDAC chargeback billing algorithm.
The billing algorithm is designed to capture all costs
directly associated with the computer facility. These
costs include (Thompson, 1986):
(1) accelerated civilian labor costs up to and including
first line supervision;
(2) rental of computer equipment;
(3) supplies and materials;
(4) maintenance of equipment;
(5) utilities;
(6) tape librarian and schedulers labor;
(7) user specific military programmer and civilian
programmer labor.
Costs excluded from reimbursement include (Thompson,
1986)
:
(1) second and higher level supervision;
(2) general and administrative expense (e.g., supply and
comptroller personnel)
;




+ (TD * UCFs)
AC = Account Charge
k = Total jobs run using computer resources
AFJ = Run Category Adjustment Factor. Jobs are charged
from 10 to 1000 percent of the basic job charge
depending on their priority and time of day they
ran. The index (j) varies from 1 to k to include
all jobs run using resources.
n = Total resources used for a job. The index (i) varies
to include all resources used for a particular job.
Values of i represent CPU time, memory time, cards
read and punched, pages printed, etc.
Uij = Utilization of resources i by job j in appropriate
units.
UCi = Unit Charge rate for resource i.
TD = File space assigned to the account in track days.
UCFs = Unit Charge for File Space.
Figure 4 The NARDAC Chargeback Billing Algorithm.
Source: R. Kekic, "ADP Chargeback System", ACCESS
v. 3, January-February 1980, p. 29.
It should be noted that the cost charged the user by
the NARDAC chargeback system billing algorithm is based on
the cost of providing the DP product or service, not upon
the value to the user receiving the service. In the opinion
of the Head, Budget Policy Counsel, NAVCOMPT all charges
to user activities must reflect the actual charges incurred
(Scott, 1983). Therefore, neither priority nor shift
differential prices are allowed, because they are based
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upon the economic value of the products and services, not
the actual cost of providing them. Thus, the objective
(refer to Chapter III) of cost recovery can be met by
NARDAC chargeback system; but the objectives of computer
resource allocation, and demand regulation cannot be met.
Consequently, an extremely important economic feature of
chargeback is negated by current NAVCOMPT interpretation of
cost charging regulations.
If computer resource allocation is an objective, a system
that allows for shift and priority pricing (i.e., differential
pricing) must be used. The EDP Analyzer summarizes this
point well in the following statement:
Data processing management should look beyond charging
as simply a means of cost recovery. Every charging
system influences user behavior. To make them work at all
satisfactory, they must be supplemented with other
policies, such as priorities. (Flexible) prices can do
all these things that these other policies do, and with
the added advantage that the users make the allocation
decision. '(November 1973, p. 13)
The consensus of opinion in the chargeback literature
reviewed by the author is that flexible price systems are
superior for resource allocation and resource utilization
to strict standard cost systems ( EDP Analyzer , July 1974) .
A modified (or hybrid) standard cost system that allows for
differential pricing would provide the user with a strong
economic motive to run long and/or low priority jobs during
slack periods when costs would be lower. This of course
would require NAVCOMPT legal counsel to modify its decision
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regarding cost recovery in a NIF environment for DP cost
recovery. Without an exception for DP cost recovery, it
is this author's opinion that NARDAC ' s stated objectives
to: provide for resource rationing, and increase the DP
activity's efficiency cannot be attained.
F. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
NARDAC users are concerned about meeting deadlines
for scheduled jobs, receiving quick service for unscheduled
jobs, fast response time for on-line jobs, service plagued
with a few disruptions (i.e., reliable service), and when
those disruptions do occur they are of short duration.
The means for evaluating performance in these areas are
now considered.
Each user receiving computer products or service from
a NARDAC has a "level of service" agreement with the NARDAC
(NAVDAC, 1986). There are up to five service level options
for each type of processing interface between the user and
the NARDAC. The user can negotiate the level that best
meets his job and budget requirements. If so agreed, the
NARDAC can provide production line processing, assuming
responsibility for control and scheduling of each applica-
tion that has undergone acceptance testing and turnover
to the NARDAC.
Performance is evaluated by (Roth, 1986):
(1) the number of written or phone-in complaints received;
(2) comparing actual job performance to the level of service
agreement standards;
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(3)- calling on the user periodically and investigating
any problems uncovered during the interview;
(4) responses to a more formal periodic "satisfactory
survey" conducted by the NARDAC in interview form.
Thus the goal of the NARDAC performance evaluation
methods can be summarized as a method to measure performance
The direct benefits as expressed by NARDAC management and
staff are (Thompson, 1986) :
(1) awareness of degrading performance;
(2) resources are more fully utilized;
(3) data storage becomes more efficiently and effectively
organized;
(4) makes application programs "in development" more
efficient and less error prone (programmers are




V. PREFERRED CHARGEBACK OBJECTIVES
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW
Before preceding with this chapter, a brief summary of
the points made and arguments advanced thus far is in order.
Chapter III presented a basic academic overview of a
chargeback system. Management goals and objectives of a
chargeback system were discussed in a more or less generic
manner. In the previous chapter, Chapter IV, the Navy
Regional Data Automation Center (NARDAC) chargeback system
was presented and the specific management policy, objectives
and chargeback criteria of this operational system were dis-
cussed. The reader should note the close agreement between
the NARDAC objectives and criteria and those objectives and
criteria gleaned from chargeback literature and presented
in Chapter III.
While the policies, objectives, and criteria needed to
reach the objectives presented thus far meet the basic
requirements of a management control system in a data
processing (DP) management context; something is still missing.
Something is still amiss, because the method by which DP
services and products have been charged to the user community
has historically not been satisfactory to managers at the
user or DP executive level. The problem, essentially, is
that there is a difference in perspective about the computer
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resource. This difference in perspective results in
communication problems among DP executives (eg. the Navy
at the OPNAV/NAVDAC level) , user management (eg. at the
Naval Air Rework Facility level), and DP management (eg.
at the NARDAC level) . Therefore, this chapter attempts
to provide that "something else" that will hopefully bridge
the communications gap between the various perspectives.
The higher level objectives presented in this chapter and
higher level criteria presented in Chapter VI are called
for purposes of this thesis, preferred objectives and
preferred criteria.
The preferred objectives and criteria were sifted from
•current and past literature on the subject of chargeback.
The author in this chapter as well as the next tries to
cement these selected ideas, along with some of his own,
into a coherent framework so as to make them more understandable
to the reader.
In order to present the preferred objectives in as
meaningful an environment as possible, this chapter
addresses two important aspects of DP management. First,
a planning system for DP resources is discussed from the
perspective of a chargeback system. Second, an operating
system for DP operations is discussed from the same
perspective. The two systems are then integrated into a
synergistic framework that will, hopefully, offer more of
an insight into how chargeback can be used as the formal
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economic communication system among DP executives, DP
managers, and user management than what is currently
available in chargeback literature.
B. INTRODUCTION
Since the labor and overhead expense of implementing,
operating, and tuning a chargeback system can be significant,
it is important to recognize the objectives of the system
and the degree to which these objectives are in accord with
those of the overall organization. While it is true,
that management objectives in charging for computer products
and services may vary from one organization to another, never-
theless, one primary objective of any organization using a
chargeback system should be to increase its financial
control over DP (Anderson, 1983).
Increased financial control can result in more efficient
and effective utilization of computing products and services
(Anderson, 1983). Since a chargeback system involves not
only DP but the customers for whom the products and services
are being performed, a chargeback system provides a mechanism
whereby the user can be made more cost conscientious (i.e.,
more efficient) . In addition, it can force the user to
economically evaluate the value received against the cost
of the service provided (i.e., become more effective) (Andersen,
1983) . The user accomplishes his objectives by controlling
his request for products and services, and by participating
in price or cost negotiations with the DP organization
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(Ein-Dor and Jones, 1985) . Therefore, a second and perhaps
just as important objective comes to the fore, that of user-
DP organizational goal synchronization. .. the communication
of DP organizational policy, user requirements, and DP
standards
.
How the DP organization, through the use of chargeback,
attempts to attain its formal and informal objectives can
have a direct effect on how the DP organiztion is viewed
by the user community. Since the preferred objectives to be
fulfilled are financial control of the computing resources,
and user-DP organizational goal synchronization, chargeback
is, therefore, tasked with the role of being the formal
communication system for accomplishing the preferred objectives
In controlling the financial aspects of DP. The primary
problems faced by DP executives are determining how much
to invest in hardware, software, and people, deciding which
proposed computer system or upgrade should be implemented,
and above all measuring the effectiveness of the DP
organization (Schaeffer, 1981). In other words, the basic
management control question condenses down to this: is DP
providing the right service, in terms of capacity, performance,
and reliability, and at the right price? One avenue at
arriving at the "correct answer" to the question appears to
lie in proper long-term planning. Therefore, the first
part of this chapter argues that the development of a DP
activity which supports the organization's goals and
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¥objectives (as discussed in Chapter III and IV) requires
the development of a management control system consisting
of two major parts or loops. The first is a viable planning
system, and the second is a strategy for operational control.
Chargeback literature discusses these two systems as though
they were separate and distinct entities (Harril, 1965;
EDP Analyzer
, August, 1975; Mushet, 1985; Andersen, 1983).
This author argues that both planning and financial control
are vital and have to be treated as an integrated whole
before a chargeback system can be operated effectively as a
management control system. Planning in this context is
not to be confused with strategic planning. The reader is
referred to Chapter I and Anthony's definitions of managerial
activities for a clear definition of the aspects of strategic
planning and management control
.
C. THE PLANNING SYSTEM
Top management, in setting the course (or direction) to
steer for the organization, must be able to assess the
productivity of the DP investment in support of that course.
Fundamental to such evaluation is a DP plan with its key
objectives articulated very clearly at the outset of the
planning period (Nolan, 1977) . Without clearly stated
objectives, management lacks a basis to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of the DP expense since there is nothing to
measure against. It is essential, therefore, not only that
the DP objectives be articulated in such a way which permits
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them to be tied to the overall objectives of the organiza-
tion, but that they be quantified in a well documented plan
to facilitate review and performance measurement against
the plan.
In developing a DP plan, management must avoid the tendency
to "plan a little in this area" (i.e., distributed process-
ing) and "plan a little in that area" (i.e., database manage-
ment) . The development of a proper DP plan can be likened
to building a ship. No shipyard would start to build a
ship until it has been completely designed, for only then
can the really hard questions be answered, such as: What
will it cost?; How economical is it (i.e., how efficient)?;
Will it float (i.e., how effective)?. Similarly, a care-
fully thought out, well quantified and documented DP plan
will allow top management to answer the questions most com-
monly asked of DP, such as: What is this new and improved
computer system going to cost?; Will it be more economical
than the old version over the long-haul?; Can it be made
to work as advertised?. Pouring funds and resources into
unplanned DP systems is like embarking on a long cruise
without the proper charts or even a compass. Any direction
is as good as any other, since you do not know where you are
at, or where you are going, or even if you are moving.
Operating a DP organization without managing its resources
means making "seat of the pants" decisions and reacting to
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events rather than planning for them. In such an ad hoc
operating environment, DP users are considered the source
of existing applications, which make up the DP organization's
workload. The job of a manager of this kind of DP organiza-
tion is viewed as ensuring that applications are processed
properly, timely, accurately, and that the results and
costs are sent to the users. In this kind of an environ-
ment, a DP control system exists, but little if any planning
for the future is done.
A slightly more sophisticated environment involves
managing the hardware resources only. In this environment,
the DP organization allows hardware availability to deter-
mine workload priorities and uses the production operating
results to review hardware utilization. In other words,
the emphasis is on the efficient and effective use of the
hardware itself. Clearly, managing the hardware system
is better than no control at all, but the DP organization
is still only being operated, no real management or planning
is taking place.
A proper planning system involves users, DP management,
systems analysts, programmers, and computer operations
personnel. Using the expected workload requirements
generated by current and "in work" applications, and the
users' projected future workload, DP management must review
the use of the computer center's total resources (personnel,
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hardware, and software) in order to anticipate future
resource needs. These needs are then converted into
actual resources (Schaeffer, 1981).
When current resources appear inconsistent with antici
pated future needs, management either must authorize
significant and timely changes in the resource mix, or
consent to a reduction in service levels. For example,
staffing may be inadequate for the planned workload, in
which case upper management may authorize the hiring of
additional, or depending on the applications, specialized
staff. If a significant increase is expected in on-line
terminals, more hardware or software resources may be
required to support the increase. These examples serve
to illustrate the required up and down the hierarchy and
across the interface communications that must take place
among users, DP management, DP executives, programmers
(systems and applications) , and computer operations
personnel in order to implement a viable planning system.
The planning system loop is depicted in Figure 5.
D. THE OPERATING SYSTEM
User management and DP management also participate in
the operating systems activities. When an application
becomes part of the DP center's workload, a DP Service
Agreement should be negotiated between the user and the DP
organization (Rizzuto and Rizzuto, 1978). The agreement














Figure 5 The Planning System Loop
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application (e.g., the number of transactions to be
processed each week, or the hours of peration for an on-
oine system) , the job priority, and the expected performance
level (i.e., the delivery time for batch reports, or the
availability hours for the on-line systems) (Cortada, 1980).
Chapter VI provides an in-depth discussion of this important
agreement. User management and DP management must review
the operating results from the computer center regularly,
comparing the results with the service agreement standards
and noting any variances (Davis and Wetherbe, 1980) . The
operating system loop is depicted in Figure 6
.
Setting standards and developing measures to those
standards is much easier said than done. Chapter VI pro-
vides an in-depth discussion of the considerations that
are necessary when setting chargeback criteria (standards)
.
Chapter VII discusses the most current concepts and theories
concerning the development and measures to standards.
E. PLANNING AND OPERATING SYSTEM CONGRUENCY
1 . A Balanced Data Processing Center
To achieve a balanced DP center operation, the DP
organization must use all resources effectively and efficiently
and maintain communications with the user community. In
order to attain such a balanced center, requires the imple-
mentation of a management control system that incorporates
management of the operating system with management of the
















Figure 6 The Operating System Loop
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terms of a planning system loop and an operating system
loop as depicted in Figure 7.
The DP organization must manage the activities
and maintain the necessary communications in both the
operating system and the planning system. When the two
systems are in congruence, users are active and informal
participants, the DP organization is responsive to user
needs, the total computer resource is put to efficient and
effective use, and DP top management makes policy, not
technical decisions about the level of resources available
for serving the users (Rizzuto and Rizzuto, 1978) . Operating
in this type of environment requires a continual examination
of the resource and service mix by the DP organization and
open communications between users and the DP organization
(Rizzuto and Rizzuto, 1978).
If the chargeback system is to be the formal economic
communications system between the planning and operating
system and among DP management, DP executives, and user
management, then it must:
(1) Permit user management to prioritize applications
make trade-offs and control their costs (Nolan,
1977) .
(2) Enable DP management to provide and measure the ser-
vice levels required by users (Rizzuto and Rizzuto,
1978) .
The two necessary attributes for effective communica-
tions can be attained through proper financial control,




















Figure 7 The Balanced DP Center
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2 . Financial Control
The first objective of a chargeback system should
be financial control. Financial control can be satisfied
in one of three ways. If some form of cost allocation is
required with limited user cost control, a cost center is
appropriate with centralized budgeting (Bernard, 1977). In
this case price equals cost by definition. With centralized
budgeting, the reader should note, however, that central or
corporate management is paying the bill. The money used by
organizations or departments to pay for computer services
and products comes from a separate budget (Bernard, 1977) .
This is commonly termed in chargeback literature as the
use of "funny money". From central mangement's perspective,
it is real money. From the user department perspective,
however, it is not real in the sense that it cannot be used
for computer products or services outside the department or
organization. Centralized budgeting is, therefore, merely a
way of rationing.
A cost center with decentralized budgeting has much
more of an impact on financial control. In this schema,
the users pay for computer services and products out of
a budget that can be used for products and services outside
or inside the DP organization. As an aside, if decentralized
budgeting is used and the user has little control over his
cost or cannot reasonably estimate his future costs because
of a poorly implemented or operated chargeback system; he
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will not be able to properly manage his business (McKell
et. al. , 1979) .
The last type of financial control is a profit
center. In this responsibility center (to borrow a term
from Anthony)
,
price can be a function of cost, or a
function of cost and profit, or a function or whatever the
market will support (Ein-Dor and Jones, 1985) .
Decentralized budgeting (NARDACs are a typical
example) can promote under or overutilization of computer
resources. This fact begs the question: what is the re-
lationship of user demand and capacity to price? In other
words, how often does a user pay more for less? This
question is significant, because it is what can happen in
a DP chargeback environment unless management is astutely
aware of the operations going on around them. There are
three cases to consider:
(1) supply is equal to demand;
(2) supply is greater than demand;
(3) supply is less than demand.
The best of all possible worlds occur where supply
just equals demands. In this situation cost (charges) will
remain constant and predictable as long as the equilibrium
situation prevails. Quite simply, users can be billed
based on the average cost incurred in processing their
jobs. Problems in billing begin to occur when supply exceeds
demand or demand exceeds supply. In order to prevent the
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user being charged more for less computer services, the
DP organization must ensure that the chargeback model has
a rate determining structure that is an independent process
from that of determining the optimal coefficients for the
chargeback algorithms. While chargeback coefficient de-
termination must precede rate setting, the objectives dif-
fer considerably. Rates are expressed as dollars per unit
of utilization. Coefficients are used to establish the
correct proportions among variables in each chargeback
algorithm for different service types (e.g., batch processing
time-sharing, and database processing) and for the same
application running on different computers (i.e., the result-
ing cost of running the same application on two different
computers is the same) . The objective of rate setting is to
adjust the levels of utilization, as computed by the charge-
back algorithms, to fully recover the DP organization's
costs (Davis and Wetherbe, 1980).
As previously stated, the rate structure must be in-
dependent of the algorithms used in chargeback. The algorithms
convert utilization statistics into a measure of computer
product and service utilization. The rate structure is used
to convert the utilization statistics into dollar charges
based upon a schedule of rates. The rate structure may
include discounts for jobs executed on the night shift or
on weekends. A surcharge may be levied for high priority
jobs or jobs that require the locking of many I/O resources.
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The rate structure must be examined at least annually
to assure recovery of all DP organizational costs. In
addition, the coefficients used in the algorithms that
form the basis of the chargeback models must be reset
annually. This is because acquisition of new equipment,
software, and people affect the optimal values of co-
efficients in the model. Therefore, a reoptimatization
(or re-tuning) is called for at least annually to recali-
brate relationship among the variables in each algorithm
type in the chargeback model.
.
3 . User-DP Organizational Goal Synchronization
The second preferred objective of chargeback is
user-DP goal synchronization. The way to achieve this is
through cost accounting effectiveness (Heilger and Matulich,
1985) . To be effective, from a cost accounting standpoint,
the chargeback system should indicate what problems are
important. For example, if product or database reliability
or performance is a problem, the chargeback system should
highlight this fact. The typical chargeback system fails
in a true cost accounting sense. It does not indicate what
problems to look into. The only thing current chargeback
systems provide is a strict measure of cost. Lehman (1973)
provides an indepth study of one of the more popular
systems, CASCOM. The emphasis in CASCOM is strict measure
of cost.
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Typically, the user cannot understand nor control
his costs and, as a result, is dissatisfied with service.
If left unchecked this dissatisfaction can lead to a lack
of user involvement and sever DP/user communications. Some
DP managers argue that the resulting problems are nothing
more than problems in user perception, or a lack of
proper training in the concepts of chargeback. Nevertheless,
whatever the cause of the problems, it is the DP manager's
responsibility to deal with them. The most effective means
of solving the above kind of problems is to ensure that all
measurements of cost presented to users be agreed upon by
users and the DP organization before hand. The measurements
should be couched in terms easily understood by computer
illiterate users, the measurements should relate to the
users' business, and the measurements should be controllable
to some extent by the user.
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The main thrust of this chapter has been:
(1) a balanced DP organization requires a management
control framework that incorporates both planning
and operational control;
(2) the chargeback algorithms utilized in a chargeback
model must provide independence of coefficients
and rate structure;
(3) the chargeback system must permit differential
pricing;
(4) the DP Service Agreement must include measurements
and standards that are understandable and, to some
extent, controllable by the user.
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If the above four concepts are properly and carefully
designed into the chargeback system, then the preferred
objectives of financial control and DP-user goal synchron-
ization are reasonably attainable.
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VI. PREFERRED CHARGEBACK PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
A. INTRODUCTION
The concern about data processing (DP) deficiencies in
the United States Government and industry is widespread.
As stated in Chapter IV, the United States Government, one
of the biggest users of data processing (DP), is very con-
cerned. The investigative arm of Congress, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) , has examined and reported on the
effectiveness of the Government's DP operations. In a GAO
report entitled "Computer Auditing in the Executive Depart-
ments: Not Enough is Being Done," costly wastes resulting
from inadequate control are mentioned. Anderson (1978) in
an article commenting on some of these inadequacies, concludes
that if some major corrective steps are not taken soon, it
will be too late. With adequate policies, the preferred
objectives of Chapter V, the preferred performance criteria
presented in this chapter, coupled with appropriately de-
rived measurements as discussed in the next chapter, per-
haps action will not be too late.
B. OVERVIEW OF DATA PROCESSING AND USER PROBLEMS
The problems faced by DP executives are determining
how much to invest in hardware, software, people, and
measuring the performance of the DP organization. In other
words, they are concerned with the question: are we providing
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the right products and services, in terms of computer
capacity, performance, and reliability, and at the right
price to the user?
Users face a different set of problems. Users require
both performance and function (McFarlan et. al., 1973).
Functional requirements are expressions describing what
processes the application, equipment, and people do. The
performance requirements are quantifyable expressions of
how well the functions are performed. In addition, users
are specialists in their own business profession. The user
works with output units, such as invoices processed, checks
processed, transactions processed, production scheduled,
parts issued, etc. As a general rule, users do not care how
the computer system works, as long as their requirements are
met. That is, as long as DP provides the products and services
they require at what they perceive to be fair, reasonable
and understandable costs (Dolotta et. al., 1976)
.
Typically, the user does not understand his DP costs,
and, therefore, cannot relate costs to requirements in
order to make products or service trade-offs. As a result,
they sometimes view the entire DP system as a failure. Hope-
fully, with the proposed objectives presented in Chapter V
and the following performance criteria, users will have a




In general, chargeback algorithms measure how much of
each resource (e.g., CPU time, memory time, channel time,
pages printed, file space, control unit time, etc.) the
application program used. The perspective is looking from
the computer system in toward the application. By definition
resource usage is time dependent. The resulting algorithm
is complex (McKell et. al., 1979) . It is expensive both
in terms of overhead to run and cost of development and
tuning maintenance. Additionally, the billings derived from
the system are difficult for DP management to explain and
users to understand. Thus, yearly budgeting, economic
trade-offs (between service and products), and planning for
the future is awkward for both the user and DP.
All chargeback performance criteria presented in Chapters
III and IV (e.g. repeatable, accurate, equitable, compre-
hensive, etc.) are from this same technological (or inward
looking) perspective. These criteria are certainly necessary,
and form a firm foundation on which to judge the effectiveness
of the chargeback model. They do not, however, by themselves
(as history has proven) solve the users' predicament.
What is needed are performance criteria that are derived
from a managerial (or outward looking) perspective (Rizzuto
and Rizzuto, 1978; Cast et. al., 1983). That is, performance
criteria that are independent of the computer environment.
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Such criteria would place more emphasis and concern on the
validity of charges to the user. As a direct consequence,
the user would (Rizzuto and Rizzuto, 1978):
(1) have more confidence in his periodic charges;
(2) will be able to use the charges for planning;
(3) will be able to use the charges to make economic
trade-offs (e.g., products for services);
(4) would have less tendency to question the resulting
report of charges.
D. UNDERSTANDABLE PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
Instead of communicating the cost of hardware resources,
software, and labor usage, as has been the case historically,
the chargeback system (not the algorithm) should enable DP
management and the user to communicate policy, service re-
quirements, and DP executive directives. That is, DP
managers should concern themselves with a managerial per-
spective that is solidly anchored in communications, as well
as with the technological perspective of the chargeback
model
.
The following performance criteria can affect both the
quality and the cost of DP products and services. Therefore,
all the criteria need to be communicated before an effective
and understandable DP service can be provided. The criteria
DP should be concerned with are:
(1) THE IMPACT THE APPLICATION HAS ON THE SYSTEM—Applica-
tions impact essentially asks the question: what are
effects of the users' application on the existing sys-
tem and on the other users, in terms of capacity, per-
formance, and availability? Applications that are
inefficient users of system resources can be identified
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and recommendations made for corrective software
maintenance, in order to avoid having to bill the
user with high costs (Rizzuto and Rizzuto, 1978).
(2) STABILITY OF THE APPLICATION—The stability of an
application can impact on DP scheduling objectives
and computer operations labor (Schaffer, 1981).
Application stability asks the question: how often
do changes applied to an application cause problems?
If a user is constantly changing his application,
or if it runs for a long time (wall clock time) without
validation routines, then these facts should be
communicated to the user, and a surcharge applied to
the basic cost (derived from the chargeback algorithm)
of running the application.
(3) THE APPLICATION'S OPERATIONAL IMPACT—Operational
impact asks the question: what is the effect of this
application on my staff? Is additional work or over-
head expense required to support the application in
the form of training requirements, specialized knowledge
or labor. If so, then a surcharge should be tacked on
to the basic cost presented by the chargeback algorithm.
Users, on the other hand, are concerned with:
(1) SERVICE LEVEL REQUIREMENTS--Service level requirements
are set by the users' needs (Rizzuto and Rizzuto,
1978). The required response time, scheduling dead-
line or turnaround times are determined by the user.
The resources and techniques for accomplishing user
specified requirements are under DP management control.
Therefore, DP management can determine whether the cost
running the application should be higher or lower
than the basic cost resulting from the chargeback model.
(This is another call for the use of differential
pricing) . Computer performance evaluations such as
load, contention, and service indicators can be col-
lected periodically in order for DP management to
assess whether the users' requirements are being met
(Schaeffer, 1981) .
(2) AVAILABILITY--Availability is another performance item
that can impact on computer operations and on other
users. For example, if a particular user applica-
tion must be the first one back on line after a sys-
tem crash or power outage or if the application
requires lots of overhead at the expense of other
applications, then a surcharge might be necessary.
In addition, availability asks the question: when
is the application scheduled to be run, and how reliable
is it? (Schaeffer, 1981).
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(3) INFORMATION STATUS— Information status asks the
questions: can the information be obtained when
needed? Is the needed information on-line, or
off-line? Basically, information status is con-
cerned with availability of needed information,
the data structure, if it is accessable by many
applications, and the peripheral device the data
is stored on.
(4) DEDICATED RESOURCES—Dedicated resources is concerned
with dedicated access channels, dedicated terminals,
perhaps a dedicated small mini-computer, or dedicated
operators
.
E. THE DATA PROCESSING SERVICE AGREEMENT
Implementation of the above preferred performance
criteria requires that a DP Service Agreement be established
between the user and DP. The following four steps are
recommended in establishing such an agreement:
(1) Identify the APPLICATION'S FUNCTION. What exactly does
this application do? For example, if the application
processes transactions, then the number of transactions
processed for the accounting period should show up on
the users' billing along with the charges.
(2) Determine the SERVICE LEVEL REQUIREMENTS. That is,
establish response time or turnaround time, the number
of on-line terminals to be used, the time the applica-
tion is required to run (e.g., Is it to be run during
peak-periods?) , if /when DEDICATED RESOURCES are re-
quired. Determine the AVAILABILITY and INFORMATION
STATUS requirements.
(3) Determine SYSTEM and OPERATIONAL IMPACT and STABILITY
of the application. In addition determine the
EXPECTED VOLUME of traffic. This enables DP to plan
resource usage and do job scheduling appropriately.
(4) DEVELOP A CHARGE. Once the expected volume service
level requirements, availability, information status,
and dedicated resources (if any) are agreed upon,
the DP manager using the chargeback algorithm's charge
as a base can develop a charge. Once an agreement
with the user as to the appropriate charge has been
reached, then the charge should be incorporated into










Figure 8 Developing a User Price
75
The question that users should ask themselves before
signing the agreement is: what is the information derived
from this application worth to my organization?
In summary, DP management and user management each
have a vested responsibility in using the computer
resources as an effective economic tool. User management
is responsible for economically justifying the applications,
and specifying the service requirements. DP management is
responsible for understanding what the applications do, for
ensuring the service requirements are met, and for ensuring
the charges remain in the guidelines established by the DP
Service Agreement. Figure 8 summaries the steps necessary




The purpose of this chapter is to explore both the con-
cept and application of measurement as it relates to measure-
ment in DP. To provide the reader with more of an understanding
and hopefully a clearer insight into measurement theory,
the exploration effort has been broken into a twofold task.
First, an academic and somewhat philosophical approach will
be undertaken to explore the underlying theories, models,
and conceptual frames associated to measurement. Secondly,
a more managerial and practical approach will be taken. A
call will be made for measurement tools that bridge the gap
between the users' view of performance against a standard
and the evaluation of the causes of that performance. By
approaching the measurement question in this manner, it is
hoped the reader will gain more of an appreciation as to
why the author has continually argued that a straight forward
chargeback model (or inward looking perspective) is not
necessarily the correct perspective when dealing with user
performance standards and how to measure to them in a DP
environment
.
During this effort the author has found it necessary
to make the assumption that measurement can be divided along
what Flamholtz et. al . has termed the "three main traditions
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which have dominated the study of organizations: the
sociological, the administrative, and the psychological
perspectives" (1985, p. 37) . Although both the pure
sociological and psychological views have equal validity
in organizational measurement and control, the administra-
tive or managerial view provides more of a DP flavor not
available in the other theoretical approaches. Accordingly,
this analysis will be from the managerial perspective.
B. WHAT IS MEASUREMENT?
The results of the literature survey have uncovered
three broad perspectives of measurement which appear to be
hierarchical. First, discrete measures in themselves can
be categorized along a continuum ranging from being descriptive
to evaluative in nature (Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980) .
Descriptive measures are value-free in that they focus on
factual characteristics and behaviors that actually exist
or occur in the organization. Evaluative measures, however,
are normative or value-laden, and are more affected by the
individual's frame of reference (Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980).
Secondly, the constellation of measures can be considered
a system of measurement by itself. Mock and Grove have
defined a measurement system as "a specified set of procedures
that assigns numbers to objects and events with the objective
of providing valid, reliable, relevant, and economical informa-
tion for decision makers" (1979, p. 220). Euske (1984) has
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identified four basic characteristics of a measurement
system which are intrinsic to this formal definition.
They are:
(1) VALIDITY—Validity refers to the degree to which
the relations among the numbers are identical to
the actual relations among the quantities being
measured.
(2) RELIABILITY—Reliability (or accuracy) refers to
the degree of variance that occurs in repeated
measurements of the same attribute. For example,
how much error is there in the measurement within
the chargeback system of a users' application? If
one application costs more to run than another, how
reliable is that measure? The degree of accuracy will
vary; the concern is not that errors exist in
measurement but that there will be ways to identify
and control the errors (Mock and Grove, 1979) .
(3) SCALE TYPE--Scale type refers to the characteristics
of the real number series that are used in a particular
set of measurements. For example, the nominal scale
is used as a means to classify items. The part number
of an inventory item is an example of the use of the
nominal scale. Another scale type is the ordinal scale
The ordinal scale is nothing more than an ordered
nominal scale. The grades of beef, bond ratings, and
different grades of diamonds are all examples of the
use of the ordinal scale.
(4) MEANINGFULNESS—Meaningfulness refers to how under-
standable the measurement information is to the user.
For example, if DP uses common terms to describe
items on its billings to users, more users would
probably understand the billings than if terms unique
to computer science were used.
These characteristics exist in varying degrees across
the spectrum of literature dealing with measurement and are
essential in evaluating alternative systems. This is due
primarily to the complex, multidimensional nature of measure-
ment problems. An example provided by Mock and Grove (1979)
is that of a valuation system. Such a system may be reliable
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if based on historical cost, but be less relevant than one
based on appraised value.
Finally, the measurement system can be viewed as a
component of a much larger organizational control system.
The preponderance of managerial control literature supports
this perspective. Flamholtz et. al. classifies measurement
as one of the four core control mechanisms, along with
planning, feedback and evaluation-reward, that "seek to
influence the behavior of individuals within the organization"
(1985, p. 38) . The total control system is described by
Flamholtz et. al. as a cybernetic process as follows:
The cybernetic process begins with the planning activity
which generates a list of work objectives and related
standards for the operational subsystem. The outcomes
of the operational subsystem are measured by various
measurement systems which provide the information for com-
parison against the pre-established goals and standards.
Observed deviations are fed back into the operational sub-
system for corrective action and into the planning element
for work goal or standard adjustment. Information from
this planning element is further evaluated and used for
reward administration. (1985, p. 39)
Such a view of cybernetic control is shared by most con-
trol authors although only Otley and Berry (1980) explicitly
cite this term to describe the control cycle of planning,
implementing, measuring, and correcting. In this case
measurement is implied in the use of accounting procedures
which, according to Otley and Berry, "serve as a control
system by providing both a language and a set of procedures
for establishing quantitative standards of performance and
in measuring actual performance in comparison with such
standards" (1980, p. 234).
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Besides viewing measurement as a three-tier haierarchy,
it also has a functional dimension. That is, what does
measurement purport to do?
C. THE FUNCTIONAL DIMENSION OF MEASUREMENT
In most studies where this question has been addressed,
the authors generally assumed that any measurement is a
form of scientific measurement, and hence, as an ideal,
measurement's function should seek to satisfy the principles
of scientific measurement (Chase and Quiland (1973); Kircher
(1959) ) • On the other hand, a number of authors (Mason and
Swanson (1959); Euske (1984); Churchman (1959)) disagree
with the assumed neutrality of the scientific measurement
approach. These authors assert that the principles of
scientific measurement largely ignore a factor that is
crucial in measurement for management decision making,
namely the individual. The scientific measurement perspective
is interested in how well the measurement reflects the "true"
nature of the object, whereas the managerial perspective asks
the additional question: how well does the measurement relate
to the users and their purposes? (Euske (1984); Grove, et . al.
(1977); Miller and Masso (1983)).
The traditional view of measurement is that of an informa-
tion communication vehicle. This functional view pertains
"since it provides the information necessary for corrective
action" (Flamholtz et. al., 1985, p. 39). As such, it is
common to note that measurement is perceived as an ex post
or feedback control device. Specifically, measurement
involves the post hoc communication of information regard-
ing deviations in performance outcomes from expectations
establis-hed in the planning phase of the cybernetic con-
trol process (Flamholtz et. al., 1985).
Recent literature on measurement and organizational con-
trol, however, have proposed another dimension of measurement,
that of behavior control. Flamholtz et. al. (1985) have
identified four ways in which measurement influences work
behavior in what is termed a psychotechnical system per-
spective of measurement:
(1) It serves as a criterion function by operationally
defining the goals and standards of activities.
(2) It induces the manager to engage in systematic
planning
.
(3) It affects perception by producing an information
set as inputs to the decision-making process.
(4) It causes attention focusing in those areas where
results are measured or rewarded.
Another explanation of this effect on human behavior,
and the decision-making process, is explained as a "functional
fixation" aspect of human behavior. This is described in
the following statement by Flamholtz et. al.:
Individuals tend to focus more attention on areas where
information is being requested. This measurement effort
has been recognized as an explicit, intended mechanism of
control. (1985, p. 40)
Functional fixation is related to an individual's frame
of reference. In the next section the effect of the reference
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frame on the concept of measurement will be discussed in
more detail.
In summary, however, measurement has both an informational
and behavioral modification function. It acts as an ex
ante, or feedforward control through its influence on work
behavior. The ex post, or feedback view supports the
traditional interpretation of measurement as an information
system.
D. THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF MEASUREMENT STANDARDS
If there is any one mysterious side to the measurement
process it is the standards utilized. These elements form
the very foundation necessary for management control. Yet
they seem to be formulated more by fiat than in scientific
basis
.
There is a dearth of literature on the subject of
developing and applying DP standards. In the few articles
that were uncovered, the common denominator is the satis-
faction of some need. To the "traditionalists," this need
is an information system supporting a management control system
The "behavioralists , " on the other hand, view measurement
as a control mechanism in itself. This divergence of con-
ceptual views of measurement leads to what will be termed
the "major schools of measurement." Each school identifies
unique criteria it considers relevant to its own specific
decision needs and then translates those needs into measure-
ment systems and standards. The differences in these
criteria become more pronounced as the data to be
measured becomes less objective (e.g., effectiveness
of service in DP)
.
An additional basis for developing measurement systems
and standards is what can be categorized as management
discretion. This relates primarily to the goals or
objectives of the organization. The majority of control
authors imply a goal-based measurement scheme to ensure
goal accomplishment of the organization.
Ijiri (1975) stresses objectivity in measurement by
specifically limiting the scope of measurement to the
economic goals of the organization. As such, only those
attributes which can be easily quantified and scaled (e. g.,
in chargeback ... items like CPU time, cost, etc.) need by
considered. This supports and affirms the inward looking
perspective of chargeback discussed in Chapter VI, and
explains why that perspective is so widely held. By restrict-
ing measurement in this fashion, the traditionalist framework
has designed out conflicting forces to their measurement
concept. Mock and Grove have noted that Ijiri 's search for
objectivity in measurement includes a scheme to "measure by
consensus" in those cases where attributes are subjective
and do not lend themselves to easy quantification:
How do we know, a priori, whether one's perception of
reality is closer to true reality then mine or your's?
-Material reality or objective reality without support by
consensus is a dangerous concept, because it can often lead
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lead to theological exercises by those who claim to be
able to see reality better than others. This is the
essential reason why I seek the basis for objectivity
in consensus. (1979, p. 229)
This explanation is an apparent attempt to insulate
the traditionalist's model of measurement and provide it
credibility in a subjective environment. Again, by
(rationally) setting standards by consensus, the traditionalist
is relieved of the requirement to justify his measurement
scale and the underlying methodology. The model's validity
and the uni-dimensional function of measurement is maintained.
In contrast,- behavioralists view the measurement-goal
relationship as both an information system and employee per-
formance appraisal system. This is summarized by Flamholtz
et. al. as follows:
An initial set of goals and standards occurs, designed to
channel individual or group effort toward organizational
ends. Once set, these become performance standards which
serve to function as ex ante and ex post control. They
serve as ex post inputs to the evaluation-reward subsystem.
Measurement directs attention toward measured dimensions
of goals, and permits corrective and evaluative feedback.
(1985, p. 34)
Thus, any management control measurement system, includ-
ing a chargeback system, must be designed with primary
attention given to the standards and goals of the organiza-
tion, and to the process by which managers assimilate and
act on measurement data (Churchman, 1959; Mason and Swanson,
1979; Miller and Masso, 1983) . This is essentially the
direction the author has tried to direct DP management with
the outward looking perspective developed from the planning-
operational framework and preferred objectives of Chapter V,
and preferred performance criteria of Chapter VII. Un-
fortunately, at present there is little in the way of
empirical studies that can be used to assist management
in the design of such a measurement system.
In each school of thought, measurement serves to
operationalize the goals within the organization. In
addition, each school's approach suffers from a serious
shortcoming. This centers on the fundamental problem of
translating goals into workable standards and measures.
The complex nature of goals does not easily lend itself
to accurate interpretation and translation. The time
dimension quality of goals (i.e., short-term, long-term),
goal ambiguity, and even conflicting goals within the same
organization inhibit the transformation process. Some
goals defy, outright, any attempt at quantitative transla-
tion. Consider, for example, the Navy Supply Systems
Command's policy of "Service to the Fleet" or the NARDAC '
s
policy of "Quality Service."
In view of such a critical link-pin problem it was
surprising to note a complete absence of literature on the
subject. Most goal-oriented authors concede only a problem
in goal-subgoal coupling. It is in this area that they have
concentrated on devising corrective systems. Management By
Objectives (MBO) is one such device. MBO is a "top-down"
method for establishing total system goals and communicating
them downward in such a way that each level of the organization
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can translate them into specific operational objectives
(Fink et. al., 1983). However, it appears more oriented
toward generating goal congruence among the organizational
members than in providing a vehicle to translate goals into
operational standards. Therefore, this author would argue
that a system more along the lines of IBM's Business System
Planning (BSP) is more apropos in a DP chargeback environment
than either MBO or Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB)
.
Another approach is a "means-end" chain of goal develop-
ment. The empahsis in this type of an approach is to
ensure goal-subgoal coupling and integration within the
organization (Fink et. al .
,
1983). If this is achieved, the
implication is that effective measures can be obtained as a
direct result of the process. The validity of this argument
is questionable. First, without designing in specific
consideration of standards development at each coupling point
there can be no guarantee that goal-subgoal coupling will,
in fact, be accomplished. Secondly, these approaches only
consider the quality control of goal development. The need
exists to verify standards concurrently with goal validation
otherwise both the feedback and feedforward value of these
tools will be suspect. This is why the care in developing
the DP Service Agreement was stessed so emphatically in
Chapter VI.
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The application of measurements is also complex. Simon
(1981) notes an interesting dichotomy in that something can-
not be accurately measured without first obtaining a complete
understanding of its nature. To impose a measurement scheme
is to imply an expected behavior characteristic or outcome.
In addition, the very act of measuring may change the
physical characteristics and attributes of the item being
measured. This anomaly, discovered by Heisenberg in
measuring scientific phenomena, now bears his name. Similar
anomalies were discovered as a result of the Hawthorne
Studies, although directed at human behavior rather than
scientific phenomena (Fink et. al., 1983). In this case,
the awareness of task measurement was responsible in causing
factory workers to display greater efficiency on the assembly
line. Such a behavioral impact supports the previously
mentioned ex ante control view of measurement.
Finally, the application of standards and measures
involves the use of surrogates to describe principals (Euske,
1984). These artificialities are, in their most basic
sense, symbols which like the data they represent, are abstract
concepts in themselves. The tendency is then for individuals
to associate unique meaning to the surrogate that goes be-
yond describing the basic characteristics of the principal
alone (Euske, 1984) . As such, the symbol takes on a special
meaning apart from the principal it purports to measure.
Therein lies the root of the entire problem of measuring
to performance standards. By applying some sort of
measurement scheme to a phenomenon, we attempt to import
objectivity and, therefore, legitimize to the outside
world the frame of the control system we are using and
create reality where there is, in actuality, no reality.
E. MEASUREMENT TOOLS
It has been said, "if you can't measure it, you can't
manage it." A corollary is that it is meaningless to have
a management standard if there is no way of determing where
you are relative to that standard. In the same vein, it is
also meaningless to measure where you are relative to a
standard that is itself irrelevant. For example, to a user
who has not been receiving reports on time, the throughput
and turnaround time from 1:30 A.M. to 2:30 A.M. on the
computer would not be exactly relevant nor meaningful.
The user only understands one thing, and that is --my report
schedule has been met only 50% of the time.
As the preceding discussion on the theory of measurement
indicated, there are many factors that must be taken into
consideration when setting standards and developing measures
to those standards. In Chapter VI various preferred per-
formance criteria (or standards) were recommended. The
emphasis was on communications between DP and user manage-
ment. To that end, it was argued that a DP Service Agreement
be established between the DP organization and the user,
and that the agreement call out the performance criteria and
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the evaluation methods to be used. Unfortunately, as
previously stated, there is little in the way of empirical
studies that can be used to assist DP management in the
design of such a measurement system. Essentially, what is
needed are measurement tools that bridge the gap between
the users' view of performance against a standard and the
evaluation of the causes of that performance.
First there exists a need for tools which measure
actual DP performance against user and DP agreed upon per-
formance standards. Computerized tools of this type, however,
are almost nonexistent. For example, measuring the percent
of time computer services were available to users on
schedule (a preferred criterium) must currently be done by
manual means. Probably the most relevant manual process
is to have the terminal user record responses in a log
book according to a predetermined sampling plan (Schaeffer,
1981) .
Secondly, there exists a need for tools that relate a
high level standard to lower level measures. That is, tools
that relate why reports are late to DASD I/O contention,
CPU load, computer unscheduled down time, etc. For example,
the reason the users' reports were late in the preceding
example might have been because of DASD I/O contention,
channel capacity, CPU load, or simply because the output
room personnel were behind in separating, decolleting, or
delivery. Facts such as these need to be communicated to
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both DP management and the user. Therefore, reports are
needed to summarize this kind of information so that the
DP manager has an understanding of his operation's per-
formance as perceived by the user before the user approaches
him for an explanation. Again, unfortunately, such tools
are not standard, and must be developed locally (Schaeffer,
1981) .
Thirdly, there exists a need for an organized approach
to analyzing problems relative to the criteria (standards)
agreed to by DP management and users. That is, given a
set of committed performance criteria, there must be
regular (e.g., at least once a week) performance measurements
of how well the DP organization is performing to the user-
DP-agreed upon criteria. The results of the measurements
must be easily understood by the users and defendable by
the DP management. This implies that criteria cannot be
set "willy-nilly," but only criteria that can and will be
measured are established and communicated.
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Measurement in the context of managerial control is an
abstract concept that is glossed over in most management
literature. Most DP managers and academicians find it
easier to talk in terms of computer performance evaluations,
input/output, and so on. By diverting the discussion away
from the subjective and remaining within the confines of the
familiar, they can effectively side-step the problem of
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"How are effective managerial control standards and
measures to them established in a DP-user environment?"
Measurement's validity and relevance are determined within
consensusally defined frames of objectivity. These frames,
in turn, can be identified to two major schools that view
measurement as either purely informational/feedback (the
traditionalist) or as behavioral control/feedforward
(behavioralist)
.
Each frame is carefully constructed to ensure internal
validity of the basic view. When analyzed from an unbiased
perspective outside of the established framework, each falls
short of providing a complete, integrative model of measure-
ment. A need exists to develop such a model. A need noted
by Flamholtz et. al . from the aspect of managerial and
organization control:
In sum, the lack of theoretical integration and the relative
inattention to measurement have limited our understanding
of the nature of the control process in complex organiza-
tions. (1985, p. 37)
In short, measurement is not as objective as most
people believe, does not exist away from the application it
purports to measure; and cannot be transported from
application to application.
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VIII. NAVAL DATA AUTOMATION COMMAND /NAVY REGIONAL DATA
AUTOMATION CENTER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES
A. INTRODUCTION
The operation of the NARDACs takes place in a much wider
context than explicitly discussed thus far. This context
serves as both a constraint and an opportunity. The con-
text is largely organizational and involves:
(1) The relative freedom allowed an individual NARDAC
.
(2) The user command's attitude and experience with
computers
.
These factors must be recognized and taken into considera-
tion in any chargeback design strategy. For example, the
author has stressed the importance of designing a chargeback
system that is:
(1) based on differential pricing;
(2) has a managerial perspective that espouses the objectives
of financial control and DP-user goal synchronization,
and incorporates the performance criteria of Chapter
VI;
(3) incorporates both planning and operational control into
a synchronized management control loop.
The above context, however, acts as a constraint on how
flexible an individual NARDAC can be. Lines of authority,
predefined responsibilities, reporting requirements, and so
on limit the discretionary power of the NARDACs. One of the
frustrations many readers of academic papers such as this
experience is that these constraints are generally brushed
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over and the recommended strategies presume that Navy DP
managers are masters of their fate. Nevertheless, the charge-
back objectives and criteria discussed in Chapters V and VI
can be incorporated into the Navy's DP plicy and procedures
over a reasonable time span by the DP executives at the
NAVDAC level. In this chapter, the main aim is to sketch
out a "climate" that will provide a suitable environment
for the NAVDAC/NARDAC complex to operate once the above
policy changes have been incorporated.
B. THE IDEAL CLIMATE FOR THE NAVY REGIONAL DATA AUTOMATION
CENTER CHARGEBACK SYSTEM
As stated before, senior DP managers at the NAVDAC level
do have the power to alter the Navy's DP chargeback infra-
structure and procedures. Therefore, the organizational
climate best suited to chargeback can be appropriately
outlined.
In the ideal climate, chargeback is not regarded pri-
marily as a mechanism for cost allocation. Viewing charge-
back from a purely cost allocation perspective fails to
acknowledge that charges have a direct influence on user
attitude and behavior. In addition, it fails to recognize
that a main motivation underlying charging is to control
computer activities.
The NARDAC chargeback system will only be fully effective
if these underlying management control objectives are ex-
plicitly considered in the design of the charging system, so
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as to ensure that the desired influence on the user does in
fact occur. Bernard et. al. emphasizes the need to
recognize these underlying objectives by advancing the
following argument:
The key objective in designing a price structure should be
to produce charges that will have the desired influence
on the users; though equity will obviously be a major
consideration in pricing, it should not be the central one.
Computer charging schemes are often made very complex in
order to achieve great accuracy in measuring users'
resource consumption. Such complexity is expensive and
often leads to charges that are incomprehensible to the
user; the accuracy obtained is of value only to the ex-
tent that it is likely to materially affect users' decisions,
and to the extent that resulting improvement in effective-
ness and efficiency justifies the cost involved. (1977,
p. 19)
In the ideal climate the computer resources are both
centralized and decentralized. It has a lower tier of well-
controlled, well-structured procedures. These include the
chargeback model so that users recognize that there is a
direct cost to them for computer resource usage. In addition,
it has sufficient slack in terms of dollars and personnel,
so that it can maintain a research development focus. For
example, if the Commanding Officer of a NARDAC feels that
more advanced data management techniques, or Decision Support
Systems (DSSs) offer potential benefits to his users, he can
assign people and resources to explore them. The contacts
with user commands must be flexible enough to allow communica-
tions on an ongoing basis with them about such potential
opportunities. In addition, user commands must have sufficient
flexibility, confidence, and expertise to provide contact
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impetus for new applications. This implies that user commands
are planning their DP future as well.
To be effective at the above, NARDACs must include
several people who have either come out of a typical users'
command or have substantial background in the typical user
command's administrative, reporting requirements, and needs.
In other words, the ideal climate will involve extensive
cross-fertilization between the "computer experts" and user
commands
.
In the ideal climate, computer training is not something
tacked onto the NARDAC functions, with annual eight hour
seminars on time sharing, teleprocessing, and the wonders of
database management. Formal mechanisms must be established
at the NAVDAC level for building this "mutual understanding"
within the Navy's NARDAC-user community. This lack of
mutual understanding has been picked out time-and-time again
as one of the main impediments to progress in DP . A joint
DP-user educational design effort beginning at the NAVDAC
level is the best mechanism for such education.
The ideal climate is reasonably attainable by balancing
the twin demands of computer resource efficiency and effective-
ness with a major emphasis on service to the user as pre-
scribed in Chapters V and VI. An important aspect of this
ideal climate is that it requires a very definite type of
computer professional and also a special kind of client-user.
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To support and underline this key point, the author
offers this argument first advanced by Gibson and Nolan
(1974) in their original four stages and later reinforced
by Cash, et . al .
:
After field studies over a seven-year period on 28
organizations, we have concluded that the managerial
situation can best be framed as one of managing tech-
nological diffusion. This approach usefully emphasizes
the enduring tension that exists between the efficiency
and effectiveness in the use of IS. At one time, it is
necessary to relax and let the organization search for
effectiveness while at another it is necessary to test
the efficiency to maintain control. (1983, p. 29)
This calls for subtlety and flexibility from IS management
and general management that too often they do not possess
or see the need for. A monolistic IS management approach
however, will not do the job. (1983, p. 31)
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The reader will recall that the NARDACs were conceived,
designed, and staffed in the late 1970 's and early 1980 's.
They were implemented into an area where chaos existed,
therefore, simplistic and mechanistic approaches to manage-
ment control, planning, and so forth were a great improvement
over what was there before. Unfortunately, the initial surge
of value from their introduction is slowly eroding away.
Dealing with this erosion problem will require the introduction
of more complexity and flexibility in the approaches used to
adapt them to the changing DP environment. This chapter pro-
posed an "ideal climate" that will provide for the required
complexity and flexibility. This ideal climate is reasonably
attainable if the twin demands of computer efficiency
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and effectiveness are balanced with a major emphasis on ser-
vice to the user. The elements of the ideal climate are:
(1) centralized and decentralized computer resources;
(2) a joint DP-user educational design effort that builds
mutual understanding within the Navy's NARDAC-user
community
.
One of the major weaknesses of the NARDAC chargeback
system is that its billings are not firmly rooted in user
management's reality. To gain a level of user support that
will assure future success will require anchoring the charge-
back system in the users' perspective. The preferred ob-
jectives of Chapter V, the preferred criteria and the DP
Service Agreement of Chapter VI, coupled with the DP climate
described in this chapter serves to assist DP management in
establishing a foundation on which to build this required and
necessary joint DP-user perspective.
Granted, the diffusion of DP technology within the Navy
must be controlled and managed. However, if poorly managed
it will not evolve into the invisioned well-functioning DP
support system; but will more than likely degrade into a
collection of disjointed and confused islands of technology
similar to what existed in the mid 1970' s.
The Navy's NARDAC s offer DP opportunities that are im-
mense. Immense in that computer technology within the Navy
can be standardized, can keep up with industrial improvements
in hardware and software, and above all, can be imbedded in
routinized labor intensive administrative, reporting, and
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decision making activities where it can provide large
economic pay-offs to users. To enjoy such immensities,
however, presumes that the NAVDAC/NARDAC complex will con-
tinue to evolve in its thinking process, and begins to more
agressively market and manage its resources and services.
If this evolutionary thinking and marking process stagnates,
Navy may end up with another technical success but an
administrative failure.
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IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The computer exists solely to help users execute their
responsibilities better through cheaper processing of data,
more efficient organization of information systems, and as
a dispersant of information that is too expensive to obtain
by any other means. The resource has no justification for
existence except to provide service to users, and these services
must allow the user to do his job more efficiently. In short,
as Dearden and Nolan so succinctly state "...the computer has
a purely economic purpose." (1973, p. 69)
If the computer is an organizational resource and should
be made to serve an economic purpose, then the question that
has to be asked and answered by DP management is: how should
this resource be managed? The DP chargeback system is one
of the most important tools for facilitating management and
control of computer resources. If properly implemented and
operated, it can improve the planned procurement, allocation,
and cost recovery of computer resources. Additionally, a
properly managed chargeback system can be made to act as the
formal economic communication system between DP management and
users. When lacking or improperly managed, however, opposite
results can occur. For example, a DP manager who ignores the
users' understanding of computers and charges in terms heavily
couched in "computereze" is proposing a system that is doomed
100
from the start to mediocrity or worse, failure. On the other
hand, a DP manager who throws up his arms and argues that a
chargeback system cannot be .designed that will work is ig-
noring the tremendous economic efficiencies that it can offer
The attainment of these economic efficiencies requires
emphasis to be shifted from a purely technological (or in-
ward looking) perspective to a managerial (or outward looking!
perspective. Intrinsic to this effort is a management
control system that incorporates the DP executives', DP
manager's, and users' viewpoint of computer resource usage
and charges.
The chargeback system is meant to make users more cost
conscious and to force them to evaluate value received
against the cost of services provided. Simply stated, a
chargeback system is nothing more than an involved measure-
ment system with a feedforward mechanism (ex ante) for
development of DP policy and procedures, and a feedback
mechanism (ex post) that continuously monitors DP manage-
ment's progress toward attainment of the overall chargeback
objectives. Acting in this manner, it should provide informa-
tion that will allow DP executives to guide the behavior of
users
.
The underlying premise of this thesis is that in addition
to equating DP management control effectiveness to measuring
the life cycle cost of the computer, these measures must also
include how effective the computer resources are being
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allocated. Thus, to be effective, the system must be
designed with primary emphasis given to the policies and
objectives of the organization and to the process by which
users assimilate and act on charges. To be effective at
this task, the chargeback system must allow for differential
pricing. Therefore, it is rational, if not vital, to charge
the user in terms that are relevant to him. The charges
should be in terms that will allow users to have a better
understanding of what they are paying for. The chargeback
system should also allow users to plan and predict their
future expenditures for DP. The user must be able to under-
stand all facets of the chargeback system; the meaning of
the resource unit being measured, the method designed to
measure it, how the service rates are determined, and the
amount of control he has over the service provided and result-
ing charges. This requires the chargeback system to provide:
(1) financial control;
(2) DP-user goal synchronization;
(3) and a means for formal communications between users
and DP.
The users must be provided with enough information to be
able to complain, demand explanations, and request adjust-
ments intelligently. If they cannot do these things, they
probably do not understand the chargeback system. Additionally,
the chargeback system should provide the DP manager with an
indication of the future volume of usage so that procurement
102
of computer resources can be anticipated and the future
for DP planned.
Chapter I began by discussing the overall objective
and purpose of this thesis. In addition, the reader was
presented with a wide perspective. In developing the
initial perspective, the following topices were discussed
(1) NARDAC ' s mission; (2) a definition of a management con-
trol system; (3) the role that a management control system
plays in an organization; (4) a brief overview of a "generic'
chargeback system; and (5) some problems facing design of
a chargeback management control system.
Chapter II provided a more in-depth look at a typical
NARDAC by examining: (1) its mission and function; (2) its
organizational structure; and (3) its client-users.
Chapter III provided the reader with a basic academic
overview of a chargeback system. The following topics were
discussed in-depth: (1) the establishment of management
goals; (2) the objectives of a chargeback system; (3) the
typical chargeback performance standards (or criteria)
.
Chapter IV discussed the NARDAC chargeback system in-
depth. In particular, the NARDAC ' s management policy and
objectives for the system, billing algorithm and rate
determination, performance criteria, and performance evalua-
tion methods were explained. As the discussion moved along,
some of the weaknesses of the system were also pointed out.
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In Chapter V, key objectives of a chargeback were identi-
fied and discussed. The preferred objectives were: financial
control, and DP-user goal synchronization. An explicit
recommendation was made that a need existed to synthesize
from these a strategy for DP control that exploits the relative
strengths of each. The stress throughout the chapter was on
the critical value of DP management and user interaction and
communication. Central to the attainment of the objectives
was the development of an integrated planning and operational
loop. In fact, the definition of a chargeback system as pre-
sented within this thesis is, in many respects, nothing more
than an effort at building a framework that can accommodate
particular aspects of DP management-user interaction on an
opportunistic basis.
Chapter VI discussed preferred (or key) performance
criteria. The chapter stressed the point that for a charge-
back system to be effective, it has to support DP-user
communication as defined in Chapter V. Effective communica-
tions requires the formulation of a DP Service Agreement
with the user for every one of his applications. The DP
Service Agreement must address all seven of the preferred
criteria, and be formulated in a specific stepwise fashion.
Chapter VII explored both the concept and application
of measurement. An attempt was made to answer such questions
as: What is measurement?; What are the functions of measure-
ment?; How are measurement standards developed and applied?;
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and, What are the measurement tools currently needed to
measure the preferred criteria as set forth within Chapter
VI?.
Chapter VIII prescribed an "ideal climate" for the
effective operation of the NARDAC chargeback system. While
the discussion was slanted toward the Navy's DP environment,
the arguments can be applied equally well to a DP operation
within a commercial enterprise. First, a two-tiered structure
for a NARDAC was recommended. The lower level would con-
sist of well-structured, well-controlled procedures that in-
clude the chargeback system. The second level would have
sufficient slack in terms of dollars and personnel so that a
NARDAC could maintain a research and development focus.
Secondly, a joint user-DP educational design effort starting
at the NAVDAC level was called for.
A chargeback system may be likened to a lens through which
a user views the DP organization. As with any lens, charge-
back can magnify, reduce, contort, or distort the users' images
of reality. Thus, the chargeback design problem becomes one
of how best to fit the user with the chargeback lens that best
assists him in the achievement of his organizational objectives
The strategy developed and discussed in the above chapters
lays the groundwork for assisting Navy DP managers in fitting
that lens to the user.
The author has conscientiously tried to present a specific
and practical approach to chargeback systems design that can
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actually be used by Navy's NAVDAC/NARDAC complex and the
private sector as well. The proposed system can be imple-
mented now and exploits the joint but different capabilities
and perspectives of DP executives, DP managers, and users.
The proposed system can be absorbed and acted upon by all
participants very quickly. Moreover, the proposed system
makes success of Navy's NARDAC chargeback system a little
more likely. The adjustments that each participant needs to
make to accomplish this are not great, they are mainly at-
titudinal, and require little new knowledge. But, and this
is an important point, the opportunities for action are
substantial, and the organizational rewards exceptionally
high.
The author does not in any way defend the results of this
thesis as more than a reasonably robust and general paradigm
that hopefully clarifies and provides the reader with some
insights into key issues that are relevant to designing an
effective chargeback system as a management control tool. In
fact, intrinsic to DP management is the notion that a charge-
back system is just one tool in a large tool box of many manage-
ment tools needed to manage and control DP.
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